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Abstract: Past few years have witnessed a growing recognition of intelligent techniques for the 
construction of efficient and reliable intrusion detection systems. Due to increasing incidents of 
cyber attacks, building effective intrusion detection systems (IDS) are essential for protecting 
information systems security, and yet it remains an elusive goal and a great challenge. In this 
paper, we report a performance analysis between Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines 
(MARS), neural networks and support vector machines. The MARS procedure builds flexible 
regression models by fitting separate splines to distinct intervals of the predictor variables.  A 
brief comparison of different neural network learning algorithms is also given. espacoespaco 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion detection is a problem of great 
significance to protecting information systems 
security, especially in view of the worldwide 
increasing incidents of cyber attacks. Since the 
ability of an IDS to classify a large variety of 
intrusions in real time with accurate results is 
important, we will consider performance measures 
in three critical aspects: training and testing times; 
scalability; and classification accuracy.  
Since most of the intrusions can be located by 
examining patterns of user activities and audit 
records (Denning, 1987), many IDSs have been built 
by utilizing the recognized attack and misuse 
patterns. IDSs are classified, based on their 
functionality, as misuse detectors and anomaly 
detectors. Misuse detection systems use well-known 
attack patterns as the basis for detection (Denning, 
1987; Kumar, 1994). Anomaly detection systems 
use user profiles as the basis for detection; any 
deviation from the normal user behaviour is 
considered an intrusion (Denning, 1987; Kumar, 
1994; Ghosh, 1999; Cannady, 1998).  
One of the main problems with IDSs is the 
overhead, which can become unacceptably high. To 
analyse system logs, the operating system must keep 
information regarding all the actions performed, 
which invariably results in huge amounts of data, 
requiring disk space and CPU resource.  
Next, the logs must be processed to convert into a 
manageable format and then compared with the set 
of recognized misuse and attack patterns to identify 
possible security violations. Further, the stored 
patterns need be continually updated, which would 
normally involve human expertise. An intelligent, 
adaptable and cost-effective tool that is capable of 
(mostly) real-time intrusion detection is the goal of 
the researchers in IDSs. Various artificial 
intelligence techniques have been utilized to 
  
automate the intrusion detection process to reduce 
human intervention; several such techniques include 
neural networks (Ghosh, 1999; Cannady, 1998; 
Ryan 1998; Debar, 1992a-b), and machine learning 
(Mukkamala, 2002a). Several data mining 
techniques have been introduced to identify key 
features or parameters that define intrusions (Luo, 
2000; Cramer, 1995; Stolfo, 2000 ,Mukkamala, 
2002b). 
In this paper, we explore Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Splines (MARS), Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) and Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN), to perform intrusion detection based on 
recognized attack patterns. The data we used in our 
experiments originated from MIT’s Lincoln Lab. It 
was developed for intrusion detection system 
evaluations by DARPA and is considered a 
benchmark for IDS evaluations (Lincoln Laboratory, 
1998-2000).  
We perform experiments to classify the network 
traffic patterns according to a 5-class taxonomy. The 
five classes of patterns in the DARPA data are 
(normal, probe, denial of service, user to super-user, 
and remote to local).  
In the rest of the paper, a brief introduction to the 
data we use is given in section 2. Section 3 briefly 
introduces to MARS. In section 4 a brief 
introduction to the connectionist paradigms (ANNs 
and SVMs) is given. In section 5 the experimental 
results of using MARS, ANNs and SVMs are given. 
The summary and conclusions of our work are given 
in section 6. 
2 INTRUSION DETECTION DATA 
In the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation 
program, an environment was set up to acquire raw 
TCP/IP dump data for a network by simulating a 
typical U.S. Air Force LAN.  The LAN was 
operated like a real environment, but being blasted 
with multiple attacks (Kris, 1998; Seth, 1998). For 
each TCP/IP connection, 41 various quantitative and 
qualitative features were extracted (Stolfo, 2000; 
University of California at Irvine, 1999). Of this 
database a subset of 494021 data were used, of 
which 20% represent normal patterns. Attack types 
fall into four main categories: 
 
- Probing: surveillance and other probing 
- DoS: denial of service 
 
- U2Su: unauthorized access to local super user 
(root)  privileges 
- R2L: unauthorized access from a remote 
machine. 
2.1 Probing 
Probing is a class of attacks where an attacker 
scans a network to gather information or find known 
vulnerabilities. An attacker with a map of machines 
and services that are available on a network can use 
the information to look for exploits. There are 
different types of probes: some of them abuse the 
computer’s legitimate features; some of them use 
social engineering techniques. This class of attacks 
is the most commonly heard and requires very little 
technical expertise.  
2.2 Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DoS) is a class of attacks where 
an attacker makes some computing or memory 
resource too busy or too full to handle legitimate 
requests, thus denying legitimate users access to a 
machine. There are different ways to launch DoS 
attacks: by abusing the computers legitimate 
features; by targeting the implementations bugs; or 
by exploiting the system’s misconfigurations. DoS 
attacks are classified based on the services that an 
attacker renders unavailable to legitimate users.  
2.3 User to Root Attacks 
User to root exploits are a class of attacks where 
an attacker starts out with access to a normal user 
account on the system and is able to exploit 
vulnerability to gain root access to the system. Most 
common exploits in this class of attacks are regular 
buffer overflows, which are caused by regular 
programming mistakes and environment 
assumptions.  
2.4 Remote to User Attacks 
A remote to user (R2L) attack is a class of attacks 
where an attacker sends packets to a machine over a 
network, then exploits machine’s vulnerability to 
illegally gain local access as a user. There are 
different types of R2U attacks; the most common 
attack in this class is done using social engineering. 
 3 MULTIVARIATE ADAPTIVE 
REGRESSION SPLINES (MARS) 
Splines can be considered as an innovative 
mathematical process for complicated curve 
drawings and function approximation. To develop a 
spline the X-axis is broken into a convenient number 
of regions. The boundary between regions is also 
known as a knot. With a sufficiently large number of 
knots virtually any shape can be well approximated. 
While it is easy to draw a spline in 2-dimensions by 
keying on knot locations (approximating using 
linear, quadratic or cubic polynomial etc.), 
manipulating the mathematics in higher dimensions 
is best accomplished using basis functions. The 
MARS model is a regression model using basis 
functions as predictors in place of the original data. 
The basis function transform makes it possible to 
selectively blank out certain regions of a variable by 
making them zero, and allows MARS to focus on 
specific sub-regions of the data. It excels at finding 
optimal variable transformations and interactions, 
and the complex data structure that often hides in 
high-dimensional data (Friedman, 1991). 
Given the number of records in most data sets, it is 
infeasible to approximate the function y=f(x) by 
summarizing y in each distinct region of x. For some 
variables, two regions may not be enough to track 
the specifics of the function. If the relationship of y 
to some x's is different in 3 or 4 regions, for 
example, the number of regions requiring 
examination is even larger than 34 billion with only 
35 variables. Given that the number of regions 
cannot be specified a priori, specifying too few 
regions in advance can have serious implications for 
the final model. A solution is needed that 
accomplishes the following two criteria: 
 
- judicious selection of which regions to look at 
and their boundaries 
- judicious determination of how many intervals 
are needed for each variable. 
 
Given these two criteria, a successful method will 
essentially need to be adaptive to the characteristics 
of the data. Such a solution will probably ignore 
quite a few variables (affecting variable selection) 
and will take into account only a few variables at a 
time (also reducing the number of regions). Even if 
the method selects 30 variables for the model, it will 
not look at all 30 simultaneously. Such 
simplification is accomplished by a decision tree at a 
single node, only ancestor splits are being 
considered; thus, at a depth of six levels in the tree, 
only six variables are being used to define the node. 
3.1 MARS Smoothing, Splines, Knots 
Selection and Basis Functions 
To estimate the most common form, the cubic 
spline, a uniform grid is placed on the predictors and 
a reasonable number of knots are selected. A cubic 
regression is then fit within each region. This 
approach, popular with physicists and engineers who 
want continuous second derivatives, requires many 
coefficients (four per region), in order to be 
estimated. Normally, two constraints, which 
dramatically reduce the number of free parameters, 
can be placed on cubic splines: curve segments must 
join, and continuous first and second derivatives at 
knots (higher degree of smoothness). 
Figure 1 shows typical attacks and their 
distribution while figure 2 (section 5) depicts a 
MARS spline with three knots (actual data on the 
rigth). A key concept underlying the spline is the 
knot. A knot marks the end of one region of data and 
the beginning of another. Thus, the knot is where the 
behavior of the function changes. Between knots, the 
model could be global (e.g., linear regression). In a 
classical spline, the knots are predetermined and 
evenly spaced, whereas in MARS, the knots are 
determined by a search procedure. Only as many 
knots as needed are included in a MARS model. If a 
straight line is a good fit, there will be no interior 
knots. In MARS, however, there is always at least 
one "pseudo" knot that corresponds to the smallest 
observed value of the predictor (Steinberg, 1999). 
Finding the one best knot in a simple regression is a 
straightforward search problem: simply examine a 
large number of potential knots and choose the one 
with the best R2. However, finding the best pair of 
knots requires far more computation, and finding the 
best set of knots when the actual number needed is 
unknown is an even more challenging task. MARS 
finds the location and number of needed knots in a 
forward/backward stepwise fashion. A model which 
is clearly over fit with too many knots is generated 
first; then, those knots that contribute least to the 
overall fit are removed. Thus, the forward knot 
selection will include many incorrect knot locations, 
but these erroneous knots will eventually (although 
this is not guaranteed), be deleted from the model in 
the backwards pruning step (Abraham, 2001). 
                    
Figure1. Intrusion Detection Data Distribution 
 
 
4 CONNECTIONIST PARADIGMS 
The artificial neural network (ANN) methodology 
enables us to design useful nonlinear systems 
accepting large numbers of inputs, with the design 
based solely on instances of input-output 
relationships.  
4.1 Resilient Back propagation (RP) 
The purpose of the resilient back propagation 
training algorithm is to eliminate the harmful effects 
of the magnitudes of the partial derivatives. Only the 
sign of the derivative is used to determine the 
direction of the weight update; the magnitude of the 
derivative has no effect on the weight update. The 
size of the weight change is determined by a 
separate update value. The update value for each 
weight and bias is increased by a factor whenever 
the derivative of the performance function with 
respect to that weight has the same sign for two 
successive iterations. The update value is decreased 
by a factor whenever the derivative with respect that 
weight changes sign from the previous iteration. If 
the derivative is zero, then the update value remains 
the same. Whenever the weights are oscillating the 
weight change will be reduced. If the weight 
continues to change in the same direction for several 
iterations, then the magnitude of the weight change 
will be increased (Riedmiller, 1993). 
4.2 Scaled Conjugate Gradient 
Algorithm (SCG) 
The scaled conjugate gradient algorithm is an 
implementation of avoiding the complicated line 
search procedure of conventional conjugate gradient 
algorithm (CGA). According to the SCGA, the 
Hessian matrix is approximated by 
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where E' and E" are the first and second derivative 
information of global error function E (wk). The 
other terms pk, s k and ?k represent the weights, 
search direction, parameter controlling the change in 
weight for second derivative approximation and 
parameter for regulating the indefiniteness of the 
Hessian. In order to get a good quadratic 
approximation of E, a mechanism to raise and lower 
?k is needed when the Hessian is positive definite 
(Moller, 1993).  
4.3 One-Step-Secant Algorithm (OSS) 
Quasi-Newton method involves generating a 
sequence of matrices G(k) that represents 
increasingly accurate approximations to the inverse 
Hessian (H-1). Using only the first derivative 
information of E the updated expression is as 
follows: 
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and T represents transpose of a matrix. The 
problem with this approach is the requirement of 
computation and storage of the approximate Hessian 
matrix for every iteration. The One-Step-Secant 
(OSS) is an approach to bridge the gap between the 
conjugate gradient algorithm and the quasi-Newton 
(secant) approach.  The OSS approach doesn’t store 
the complete Hessian matrix; it assumes that at each 
iteration the previous Hessian was the identity 
matrix. This also has the advantage that the new 
search direction can be calculated without 
computing a matrix inverse (Bishop, 1995). 
4.4 Support Vector Machines (SVMs) 
The SVM approach transforms data into a feature 
space F that usually has a huge dimension. It is 
interesting to note that SVM generalization depends 
on the geometrical characteristics of the training 
data, not on the dimensions of the input space 
(Bishop, 1995; Joachims, 1998). Training a support 
vector machine (SVM) leads to a quadratic 
optimization problem with bound constraints and 
one linear equality constraint. Vapnik (Vladimir, 
1995) shows how training a SVM for the pattern 
recognition problem leads to the following quadratic 
optimization problem (Joachims, 2000): 
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where l is the number of training examples a is a 
vector of l variables and each component 
ia corresponds to a training example (xi, yi). The 
solution of (1) is the vector *a for which (1) is 
minimized and (2) is fulfilled.  
5 EXPERIMENTS 
In our experiments, we perform 5-class 
classification. The (training and testing) data set 
contains 11982 randomly generated points from the 
data set representing the five classes, with the 
number of data from each class proportional to its 
size, except that the smallest classes are completely 
included. The normal data belongs to class1, probe 
belongs to class 2, denial of service belongs to class 
3, user to super user belongs to class 4, remote to 
local belongs to class 5. A different randomly 
selected set of 6890 points of the total data set 
(11982) is used for testing MARS, SVMs and 
ANNs. Overall accuracy of the classifiers is given in 
Tables 1-4. Class specific classification of the 
classifiers is given in Table 5. 
5.1 MARS Experiments Express ! 
We used 5 basis functions and selected a setting of 
minimum observation between knots as 10. The 
MARS training mode is being set to the lowest level 
to gain higher accuracy rates. Five MARS models 
are employed to perform five class classifications 
(normal, probe, denial of service, user to root and 
remote to local). We partition the data into the two 
classes of “Normal” and “Rest” (Probe, DoS, U2Su, 
R2L) patterns, where the Rest is the collection of 
four classes of attack instances in the data set. The 
objective is to separate normal and attack patterns. 
We repeat this process for all classes. Table 1 
summarizes the results of the experiments. 
5.2 Neural Network Experiments  
The same data set described in section 2 is being 
used for training and testing different neural network 
algorithms. The set of 5092 training data is divided 
in to five classes: normal, probe, denial of service 
attacks, user to super user and remote to local 
attacks. Where the attack is a collection of 22 
different types of instances that belong to the four 
classes described in section 2, and the other is the 
normal data. In our study we used two hidden layers 
with 20 and 30 neurons each and the networks were 
trained using training functions described in Table 6. 
The network was set to train until the desired mean 
square error of 0.001 was met. As multi-layer feed 
forward networks are capable of multi-class 
classifications, we partition the data into 5 classes 
(Normal, Probe, Denial of Service, and User to Root 
and Remote to Local).  
                Table 1. MARS Test Performance
Class Accuracy 
Normal 96.08 % 
Probe 92.32 % 
DOS 94.73 % 
U2Su 99.71 % 
 
R2L 99.48 % Fig. 2 – MARS data estimation using splines and knots. 
   
 
Table 2. Test Performance of Different Neural Network Training Functions 
 
Function No of Epochs Accuracy (%) 
Gradient descent 3500 61.70 
Gradient descent with momentum 3500 51.60 
Adaptive learning rate 3500 95.38 
Resilient back propagation 67 97.04 
Fletcher-Reeves conjugate gradient 891 82.18 
Polak-Ribiere conjugate gradient 313 80.54 
Powell-Beale conjugate gradient 298 91.57 
Scaled conjugate gradient 351 80.87 
BFGS quasi-Newton method 359 75.67 
One step secant method 638 93.60 
Levenberg-Marquardt 17 76.23 
Bayesian regularization 533 64.15 
 
Table 3. Performance of the Best Neural Network Training Function (Resilient Back Propagation) 
 
Class of Attack Normal Probe DoS U2Su R2L % 
Normal 1394 5 1 0 0 99.6 
Probe 49 649 2 0 0 92.7 
DoS 3 101 4096 2 0 97.5 
U2Su 0 1 8 12 4 48.0 
R2L 0 1 6 21 535 95.0 
% 96.4 85.7 99.6 34.3 99.3  
 
Table 4. Test Performance of SVMs 
Class of Attack Training Time (sec) Testing Time (sec) Accuracy (%) 
Normal 7.66 1.26 99.55 
Probe 49.13 2.10 99.70 
DoS 22.87 1.92 99.25 
U2Su 3.38 1.05 99.87 
R2L 11.54 1.02 99.78 
  
Table 5. Performance Comparison of Testing for 5 class Classifications 
Accuracy (%) 
Class of Attack 
SVM RP SCG OSS MARS 
Normal 98.42 99.57 99.57 99.64 96.08 
Probe 98.57 92.71 85.57 92.71 92.32 
DoS 99.11 97.47 72.01 91.76 94.73 
U2Su 64 48 0 16 99.71 
R2L 97.33 95.02 98.22 96.80 99.48 
      
We used the same testing data (6890), same 
network architecture and same activations functions 
to identify the best training function that plays a vital 
role for in classifying intrusions. Table 2 
summarizes the performance of the different 
learning algorithms. The top-left entry of Table 3 
shows that 1394 of the actual “normal” test set were 
detected to be normal; the last column indicates that 
99.6 % of the actual “normal” data points were 
detected correctly. In the same way, for “Probe” 649 
of the actual “attack” test set were correctly 
detected; the last column indicates that 92.7% of the 
actual “Probe” data points were detected correctly. 
The bottom row shows that 96.4% of the test set said 
to be “normal” indeed were “normal” and 85.7% of 
the test set classified, as “probe” indeed belongs to 
Probe. The overall accuracy of the classification is 
97.04 with a false positive rate of 2.76% and false 
negative rate of 0.20. 
5.3 SVM Experiments 
The data set described in section 5 is being used to 
test the performance of support vector machines. 
Because SVMs are only capable of binary 
classifications, we will need to employ five SVMs, 
for the 5-clas classification problem in intrusion 
detection, respectively. We partition the data into the 
two classes of “Normal” and “Rest” (Probe, DoS, 
U2Su, R2L) patterns, where the Rest is the 
collection of four classes of attack instances in the 
data set. The objective is to separate normal and 
attack patterns. We repeat this process for all 
classes. Training is done using the RBF (radial bias 
function) kernel option; an important point of the 
kernel function is that it defines the feature space in 
which the training set examples will be classified. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the experiments. 
 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
A number of observations and conclusions are 
drawn from the results reported: MARS is superior 
to SVMs in respect to classifying the most important 
classes (U2Su and R2L) in terms of the attack 
severity. SVMs outperform ANNs in the important 
respects of scalability (the former can train with a 
larger number of patterns, while would ANNs take a 
long time to train or fail to converge at all when the 
number of patterns gets large); training time and 
running time (SVMs run an order of magnitude 
faster); and prediction accuracy. SVMs easily 
achieve high detection accuracy (higher than 99%) 
for each of the 5 classes of data, regardless of 
whether all 41 features are used, only the important 
features for each class are used, or the union of all 
important features for all classes are used. Resilient 
back propagation achieved the best performance 
among the neural network learning algorithms in 
terms of accuracy (97.04 %) and faster convergence 
(67 epochs). We note, however, that the difference 
in accuracy figures tend to be very small and may 
not be statistically significant, especially in view of 
the fact that the 5 classes of patterns differ in their 
sizes tremendously. More definitive conclusions can 
only be made after analysing more comprehensive 
sets of network traffic data. 
Finally, another gifted research line includes the 
potential use of MARS hybridized with self-
organized ant-like evolutionary models as proposed 
in past works (Ramos, 2003; Abraham, 2003). The 
implementation of this swarm intelligence along 
with Stigmergy (Ramos, 2002) and the study of ant 
colonies behaviour and their self-organizing 
capabilities are decisively of direct interest to 
knowledge retrieval/management and decision 
support systems sciences. In fact they can provide 
new models of distributed, adaptive and collective 
organization, enhancing MARS data estimation on 
 ever changing environments (e.g. dynamic data on 
real-time), as those we now increasingly tend to face 
over new disseminated Information Systems 
paradigms and challenges. 
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